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ABSTRACT 
We introduce the construct of moral insight and study how it can be elicited when people face 
ethical dilemmas—challenging decisions that feature tradeoffs between competing and 
seemingly incompatible values. Moral insight consists of discovering solutions that move beyond 
selecting one conflicting ethical option over another. Moral insight encompasses both a cognitive 
process and a discernible output: it involves the realization that an ethical dilemma might be 
addressed other than by conceding one set of moral imperatives to meet another, and it involves 
the generation of solutions that allow competing objectives to be met. Across four studies, we 
find that moral insight is generated when individuals are prompted to consider the question 
“What could I do?” in place of their intuitive approach of considering “What should I do?” 
Together, these studies point toward a theory of moral insight and important practical 
implications. 
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Employees and managers regularly face ethical challenges that involve tradeoffs between 
competing moral values or principles (Toffler, 1986; Badaracco and Useem, 1993; Paine, 1997; 
Palmer, 2012). For instance, imagine that during a private conversation with a friend working at 
another company, you learn some confidential information about an impending event that will 
put your own company and one of its clients at great risk of considerable loss (Badaracco and 
Useem, 1993). This dilemma presents two possible courses of action: disclose the information to 
your boss, who can take action to prevent the loss, but in so doing, breach confidentiality and 
loyalty to a friend; or uphold your commitment to confidentiality and friendship by remaining 
silent, thereby risking tremendous damage to your employer and one of its clients. In this moral 
dilemma and in others, the competing principles are both highly valued, and choosing one value 
seems to necessitate forgoing the other, making the problem difficult to solve with no obvious 
“right” answer. 
Despite the prevalence of ethical dilemmas in organizations, to date research in ethics has 
predominately focused on misconduct, another type of ethical challenge in which individuals 
understand the morally “right” path, but fail to follow their moral compass (Tenbrunsel, 1998; 
Schweitzer, Ordóñez, and Douma, 2004; Mead, Baumeister, Gino, Schweitzer, and Ariely, 2009; 
Tenbrunsel, Diekmann, Wade-Benzoni, and Bazerman, 2010; Bazerman and Gino, 2012). A 
growing body of research has illuminated how people approach temptations to cheat and lie 
(Chugh and Bazerman, 2007; Shu, Gino, and Bazerman, 2011; Moore, Detert, Trevino, Baker, 
and Mayer, 2012) as well as the myriad organizational sources of misconduct (Darley, 1996; Does Could Lead to Good? 4 
Vaughan, 1999; Brief, Buttram, and Dukerich, 2001; Palmer, 2012), while beginning to find 
potential remedies (Gino and Margolis, 2011; Shu, Mazar, Gino, Ariely, and Bazerman, 2012). 
But when it comes to ethical dilemmas, there is a striking dearth of research on (1) how people 
cognitively approach organizationally relevant moral dilemmas; (2) how they resolve those 
dilemmas; and (3) what effective interventions might exist to enhance their capacity to find 
resolutions to dilemmas. Because people facing moral dilemmas often arrive at a solution or 
decision after weighing their options, past research has investigated how, why, and under what 
conditions people choose one ethical imperative over the other (Kohlberg, 1971; Gilligan, 1982; 
Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, and Cohen, 2001; Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, 
Nystrom, and Cohen, 2008). More recently, researchers have found that emotions influence 
ethical judgments and decisions, which had long been assumed in psychology to be a product of 
logical and deliberative reasoning (Haidt, 2001; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, and Cohen, 
2004; Monin, Pizarro, and Beer, 2007; Ditto, Pizarro, and Tannenbaum, 2009; Uhlmann, Pizarro, 
Tannenbaum, and Ditto, 2009).  
When encountering difficult ethical challenges, people generally ask themselves the 
Socratic question “What should I do?” (Victor and Cullen, 1988). And guidance is typically cast 
in terms of “should.” For example, we created a dataset with the ethics codes of Fortune 50 
companies sampled in 2013 and counted the number of times the word “should” appeared in 
each ethics code. We found that “should” appears approximately thirty times on average in each 
of them. Organizations, it seems, frame the principles to guide managerial conduct in terms of 
“should.” Despite the pervasiveness of having a “should” mindset when confronting moral 
dilemmas (see also Study 1), in this paper we suggest that approaching ethical dilemmas with 
such a mindset reduces people’s likelihood of generating moral insight. Moral insight consists of Does Could Lead to Good? 5 
discovering solutions other than selecting one of the competing ethical options over another. 
Moral insight encompasses both a cognitive process and a discernible output: it involves the 
realization that an ethical dilemma might be addressed other than by conceding one set of moral 
imperatives to another, and it involves the generation of solutions that allow both competing 
imperatives to be met.  
Whereas a “should” mindset may encourage individuals to think analytically in weighing 
the vying moral claims of the most apparent courses of action, people may often benefit from a 
more expansive exploration of possible solutions before making a final decision. We propose 
that considering what one could do shifts people from analyzing and weighing what they assume 
to be fixed and mutually exclusive alternatives to generating options that might reconcile 
underlying imperatives. In the famous Heinz dilemma (Kohlberg, 1971), for example, rather than 
choose between stealing a drug your spouse needs for survival and obeying laws that protect 
property, some people suggest that Heinz might speak to the druggist who owns the medicine 
(Gilligan, 1982). When facing ethical dilemmas, shifting individuals from a more conventional 
“should” mindset to a less conventional “could” mindset encourages greater exploration of 
possibilities, increasing individuals’ ability to discover practical solutions to moral dilemmas that 
move beyond conceding one or more moral principles to meet another. 
The present research makes three main contributions to the literature. First, it extends 
how ethical dilemmas have traditionally been studied. Prior research on dilemmas has presented 
individuals with a choice between two possible decisions, showcasing the tension between moral 
imperatives and revealing the factors that lead individuals to choose one moral value or principle 
over the other (Kohlberg, 1971; Trevino, 1986; Jones, 1991). Rather than investigate which of 
two predetermined options is chosen and why, we examine how novel options might be Does Could Lead to Good? 6 
generated. Like the dilemmas featured in prior research (Kohlberg, 1971; Rest, Bebeau, Narvez, 
and Thoma, 1999; Greene, et al., 2001), the real ethical dilemmas that managers face (Badaracco 
and Useem, 1993; Paine, 1997) typically embody a stark choice. But there are often multiple 
possible courses of action individuals could potentially devise—beyond the apparent stark 
choices—when facing dilemmas. We build on research in ethics (Gilligan, 1982), insight (Smith, 
1995; Sternberg and Davidson, 1995; Schilling, 2005), creativity (Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer, 
1995; Sternberg and Davidson, 1995; Miron-Spektor, Gino, and Argote, 2011), decision making 
(Larrick, 2009), and negotiation (Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, and Valley, 2000; Malhotra and 
Bazerman, 2007; Harinck and De Dreu, 2008) to show that dilemmas sometimes become 
tractable when incompatible imperatives are approached in novel ways.  
Second, we capture this approach by introducing the concept of moral insight, defined as 
discovering solutions to moral dilemmas in a way that does not entail conceding one of the 
colliding ethical imperatives to honor another. Thus far, research linking creativity and ethics has 
focused on the domain of self-dealing, showing that creativity increases the likelihood that 
individuals will engage in unethical behavior (Wang, 2011; Gino and Ariely, 2012). When 
individuals are tempted to cheat for personal gain, creativity sparks greater mental flexibility in 
justifying unethical actions. But creativity may operate differently in the domain of dilemmas, 
where individuals face competing moral imperatives rather than an opportunity to gain 
personally at the expense of ethics. We suggest that for moral dilemmas, creative thinking—
prompted through having a “could” mindset—helps individuals formulate a broader set of 
practical solutions that potentially resolve the collision of ethical imperatives.  
Third, we offer a simple-to-implement intervention that helps individuals address moral 
dilemmas more constructively. Prior research has shown that when people encounter temptations Does Could Lead to Good? 7 
to cheat, contemplation and discussion leads people to make more thoughtful, ethical decisions 
(Gunia, Wang, Huang, Wang, & Murnighan, 2012), and that the ethical content of one’s thoughts 
drives behavior (Reynolds, Dang, Yam, and Leavitt, 2014). We suggest that in the context of 
moral dilemmas, the content of contemplation and conversation matters, particularly in situations 
where creative problem-solving is helpful in navigating competing imperatives and moral 
tradeoffs. We show that a possible intervention to change how individuals contemplate and 
discuss moral dilemmas need not be complex. That is, an intervention as simple as shifting an 
individual’s mindset from contemplating “What should I do?” to “What could I do?” can help 
individuals generate moral insight that resolves difficult ethical dilemmas.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES	
Moral dilemmas, as experienced in the workplace or as distilled in research studies, often 
challenge individuals to prioritize one moral imperative over others when given a forced choice. 
For example, Kohlberg’s Heinz dilemma (1971) asks individuals whether a destitute husband 
should steal over-priced drugs to save the life of his dying wife, forcing these evaluators to 
weigh the cost of stealing and breaking the law against the benefit of saving a life. Similarly, the 
trolley dilemma asks individuals whether they should actively divert a runaway trolley onto a 
path that would kill one person in order to save five lives (the utilitarian choice), or whether they 
should choose inaction, spare one life, and leave the train on course to kill five people (the 
deontological choice) (Thomson, 1986).   
Psychology and management research have proposed a variety of theories for explaining 
individuals’ moral reasoning. The cognitive-developmental perspective, for instance, argues that 
people progress through stages of moral development—from acting based on the punishments 
associated with each course of action to making a decision based on one’s fundamental and Does Could Lead to Good? 8 
universal moral principles (Kohlberg, 1971). These stages, in turn, interact with the context of 
the situation to guide action and reasoning (Kohlberg, 1971; Trevino, 1986). More recently, 
research has proposed a dual-process model to explain how we think through moral dilemmas. 
This research has focused on ethical dilemmas that produce a tension between deontological 
reasoning (which emphasizes individuals’ duties) and utilitarian reasoning (which values the 
greater good for the greatest number) (Greene, et al., 2004). Research testing this model shows 
that automatic emotional responses drive deontological moral judgments, whereas cognitive 
processes drive more utilitarian thinking (Greene, et al., 2001; Greene, et al., 2004; Greene, et 
al., 2008). That is, individuals are less likely to kill one person in order to save five people when 
emotional systems are driving decisions in the trolley dilemma (Greene, et al., 2001). More 
recently, some have proposed contingency models, suggesting that how human beings resolve 
the ethical challenges they face—and the suitability of a given approach—depends on the nature 
of the ethical challenge (Pizarro and Bloom, 2003; Monin, Pizarro, and Beer, 2007; Bennis, 
Medin, and Bartels, 2010; Zhong, 2011). 
In sum, past research on moral dilemmas has investigated how individuals respond to 
competing imperatives as they consider what they should do in these situations. The act of 
thinking about “should” leads individuals to prioritize one moral claim over another and focus on 
the justifications of their decision. Whereas prior research has focused on the final decision 
individuals make given the constraint that they can choose only one of the two courses of action 
provided, our research takes a different approach toward solving dilemmas: we focus on the 
courses of action individuals generate when they confront a dilemma in different ways. 
Integrating research in both creativity (Sternberg, 1988; Amabile, 1996; Sternberg and Lubart, Does Could Lead to Good? 9 
1999) and insight (Smith, 1995; Sternberg and Davidson, 1995), we examine instances of moral 
insight, when people move beyond the two most apparent courses of action present in a dilemma.  
Developing Moral Insight 
Managerial dilemmas are as often about formulating novel solutions to seemingly 
intractable conflicts (Toffler, 1986; Paine, 2002; Freeman, 2010) as they are about choosing one 
moral principle over another. In the opening example, you could decide to tell your boss or 
simply keep quiet, sacrificing one moral imperative for another, or you might leave an 
anonymous note for your boss with the key information. While the latter course of action is not 
without its problems, it does illustrate an alternative path toward resolving moral collisions by 
honoring moral commitments to both your friend and your employer. Similarly, many other real-
world ethical dilemmas promise multiple solutions that either integrate competing objectives or 
incorporate alternative approaches that change the nature of the problem.  
We suggest that when facing moral dilemmas people generate moral insight in the same 
way they generate insight when facing creativity problems (Isen, Daubman, and Nowicki, 1987). 
Moral insight consists of novel and practical solutions that move beyond conventional responses 
requiring the sacrifice of one or more moral principles to meet another. Research on insight 
problems has indicated that the cognitive processes that lead to solutions neither occur to people 
immediately on presentation of the problem, nor emerge from analysis and deliberation. Rather, 
the insight strikes like a bolt—the proverbial “Eureka!” moment—changing the solver’s mental 
representation of the problem (Sternberg, 1988; Seifert, Meyer, Davidson, Patalano, and Yaniv, 
1994; Schilling, 2005).  
In the context of moral dilemmas, we argue that generating moral insight involves 
shifting individuals’ mental representation of dilemmas away from making a choice between Does Could Lead to Good? 10 
forced tradeoffs. Just as insight in problems like Duncker’s candle (1945) entails relaxing 
assumptions that the functions of objects are fixed, moral insight entails relaxing assumptions 
that there are fixed options from which to choose. There is already some evidence that 
individuals consider routes to solving these moral dilemmas beyond the choices provided. In 
Gilligan’s classic re-examination of the Heinz dilemma (1982), some individuals thought Heinz 
should neither steal the drug nor let his wife die, but, instead, should discuss the situation with 
the druggist. In contrast to research on non-moral insight (Duncker and Lees, 1945) and 
creativity (Mednick, 1962; Rowe, Hirsh, and Anderson, 2007), which typically examines 
convergence around a single but non-obvious relationship between objects and concepts, central 
to our definition of moral insight is the possibility that multiple solutions exist beyond selecting 
one side of the dilemma or the other.  
Put differently, moral insight encompasses both a cognitive process and a discernible 
output: It involves both the realization that an ethical dilemma might be addressed other than by 
conceding one set of moral imperatives to meet another. This realization helps generate solutions 
that allow competing objectives to be met, either through some form of integration or 
reformulation of the problem itself. 
Shifting to a “Could” Mindset 
Existing research has shown the importance of matching cognitive processes to the nature 
of the ethical challenge faced. For example, extended contemplation has been shown to increase 
the likelihood that individuals will make ethical decisions in both individual and group contexts, 
particularly when individuals lack justifications for their unethical behaviors (Caruso and Gino, 
2010; Gunia, Wang, Huang, Wang, and Murnighan, 2012; Shalvi, Eldar, and Bereby-Meyer, 
2012). However, in other conditions, most notably when another’s welfare is pitted against an Does Could Lead to Good? 11 
actor’s own interests, quick intuitive responses increase the likelihood of ethical choice (Zhong, 
2011). In sum, interventions that tailor cognition to the nature of the ethical challenge are 
essential (Bennis, Medin, and Bartels, 2010; Moore and Tenbrunsel, 2014).  
In the context of moral dilemmas, individuals generally approach these problems by 
contemplating what they should do. We propose that despite the prevailing tendency to use this 
approach when facing moral dilemmas (see Study 1), shifting individuals’ contemplation toward 
what they could do changes both their perception of the dilemma and the solutions that they 
reach. Because the question “What should you do?” implies selecting one moral path, “should” 
mindsets may lead individuals to focus on weighing and choosing one of two possible courses of 
action in these dilemmas. Consequently, thinking about “shoulds” may lead people to satisfice in 
settling for a solution that meets the primary ethical priority while neglecting the other value.  
In contrast, a “could” mindset may shift individuals to reconceive the problem as one that 
does not necessarily involve forced tradeoffs. Langer and Piper (1987) found that considering 
what objects could be as opposed to what objects were helped individuals transcend the problem 
of functional fixedness, or the inability to use objects beyond the purposes for which they were 
originally designed (Luchins, 1942; Isen, Daubman, and Nowicki, 1987). For example, when 
confronted with the need to erase a mark without using an eraser, individuals who merely 
considered what objects could be were more likely to recognize that a rubber band could be used 
in lieu of an eraser, compared to those who considered what these objects were. Just as thinking 
about what objects could be influenced individuals to overcome the rigidity of considering only 
conventional uses of objects, we propose that contemplating what one could do in moral 
dilemmas helps individuals think beyond the rigidity of making forced tradeoffs between moral Does Could Lead to Good? 12 
principles, thus imagining how ostensibly competing imperatives might be less incompatible (see 
Figure 1 for conceptual model).	
Hypothesis 1: A “could” mindset decreases the extent to which competing objectives 
appear incompatible relative to a “should” mindset. 
We also argue that “could” carries the connotation of multiple possibilities. That is, part 
of the reason that individuals were able to reach creative solutions after considering what objects 
could be is that the mental exercise helped individuals think about alternative uses for the focal 
object (Langer and Piper, 1987). Similarly, considering what individuals could do in moral 
dilemmas will not only relax the assumptions that there is a choice to be made and that the 
imperatives are necessarily incompatible, but also unlock individuals’ ability to engage in 
divergent thinking, so they consider multiple solutions to problems (McCrae, 1987; Runco, 
1991; Silvia, Winterstein, Willse, Barona, Cram, Hess, Martinez, and Richard, 2008).  
Hypothesis 2: A “could” mindset increases divergent thinking—or the formulation of 
multiple solutions—in moral dilemmas relative to a “should” mindset. 
Because divergent thinking involves thinking “without boundaries” or “outside the box” 
(Thompson, 2008, p. 226), consideration of multiple solutions is helpful in discovering more 
insightful and creative solutions (Baer, 1994). By considering multiple possible solutions, 
divergent thinking helps individuals make new connections and associations (Guilford, 1968; 
Guilford, 1982), reducing individuals’ propensity to settle upon obvious answers and increasing 
their ability to reach innovative solutions to problems (Williams, 2004). Given the link between 
divergent exploration and organizational creativity (Woodman, Sawyer, and Griffin, 1993), we 
expect that having a “could” mindset will trigger individuals to consider multiple solutions that 
will eventually help them find more novel resolutions to the dilemma. Does Could Lead to Good? 13 
In research on interpersonal conflict, thinking creatively beyond conventional options has 
been found to generate integrative solutions (Kurtzberg, 1998; De Dreu, Giacomantonio, Shalvi, 
and Sligte, 2009), so we adapt principles from negotiation to study the intrapersonal conflict that 
individuals experience when confronted with ethical dilemmas. When negotiators perceive their 
environment as competitive, they often assume that goals across negotiating parties are 
negatively related, implying that they must make distributive tradeoffs in order to find solutions 
(Carnevale and Probst, 1998; Tjosvold, 1998). This competitive mindset often leads individuals 
to reach purely distributive solutions that assume the size of the economic pie as given (Baron, 
Bazerman, and Shonk, 2006; Malhotra and Bazerman, 2007; Demoulin and Teixeira, 2010; 
Fisher, Ury, and Patton, 2011). In contrast, negotiators who realize the potential to reconcile 
competing sides are more likely to discover integrative solutions that expand the size of the 
overall pie and often maximize outcomes for both negotiating parties (Brandenburger and 
Nalebuff, 1996; De Dreu, 2003; Harinck and De Dreu, 2008).  
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
Additionally, research shows that adopting a paradoxical framework (Lewis, 2000), or 
“mental templates used to embrace seemingly contradictory” elements of a task (Miron-Spektor, 
Gino, and Argote, 2011; pg. 229), generates more innovation (Smith and Tushman, 2005; 
Gebert, Boerner, and Kearney, 2010) and creativity (Carnevale and Probst, 1998; Miron-Spektor, 
Gino, and Argote, 2011). That is, casting seemingly paradoxical or incompatible goals as 
potentially reconcilable helps individuals consider ways to meet both objectives, rather than 
satisficing to meet just one (Austin and Vancouver, 1996; Lüscher and Lewis, 2008). Taken Does Could Lead to Good? 14 
together, we propose that applying a “could” mindset toward ethical dilemmas increases moral 
insight, enhancing individuals’ ability to look beyond forced tradeoffs, prompting them to 
develop a wider set of possible options, and ultimately helping them formulate solutions that 
uphold colliding moral imperatives.	
Hypothesis 3a: A “could” mindset relative to a “should” mindset increases the 
propensity to formulate moral insight solutions. 
Hypothesis 3b: The effect of a “could” mindset on the propensity to formulate moral 
insight solutions is mediated by the extent to which individuals engage in divergent 
thinking. 
Hypothesis 3c: The effect of a “could” mindset on the propensity to formulate moral 
insight solutions is mediated by the extent to which multiple objectives appear less 
incompatible. 
Overview of the Present Research 
We test our predictions regarding the impact of a “could” mindset on generating moral 
insight across four experiments. Study 1 shows that people intuitively ask themselves “What 
should I do?” when contemplating moral dilemmas. Despite the tendency to approach moral 
dilemmas this way, Studies 2 through 4 show that asking “What could I do?” leads individuals to 
think more expansively about dilemmas, generating moral insight. In Study 2, we find that a 
“could” mindset helps individuals view ostensibly incompatible ethical goals as less 
incompatible relative to either a “should” or “would” mindset. Study 3 reveals that compared to 
having a “should” mindset, contemplating “What could I do?” leads individuals to engage in 
more divergent thinking as they explore possible options, helping them formulate a greater range 
of possible solutions. Finally, Study 4 shows that adopting a “could” mindset in interpersonal Does Could Lead to Good? 15 
contexts helps individuals generate moral insight when discussing a moral dilemma with each 
other. 
STUDY 1: DEFAULT APPROACH TO ETHICAL DILEMMAS 
The goal of this study was to examine how individuals intuitively approach moral 
dilemmas compared to amoral dilemmas. 
Participants 
We recruited sixty participants (Mage = 32.38, SD = 13.39; 38% female) on Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk for a study that asked them to provide their thought process on hypothetical 
scenarios and paid them $0.50 in Amazon.com credit for completing the five-minute study. Past 
research has shown that the Mechanical Turk service provides reliable data for research purposes 
(Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling, 2011). 
Design and Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to read either two moral dilemmas (e.g., the Heinz 
dilemma) or two amoral dilemmas (See Appendix A). They were then instructed to complete the 
following question with a word or phrase that best captured what they were thinking as they 
considered their response to each dilemma: “What _____ I do?” Two independent raters blind to 
the purpose of the study then coded each response based on whether they contained the word 
“should,” “could/can,” or “will/would.” Because we achieved good interrater reliability on the 
percentage of responses across the dilemmas that contained the word “should” (ICC2 = .99, p < 
.001) or “could” (ICC2 = .99, p < .001), we averaged the ratings between the two coders.  
We hypothesized that participants would be more likely to use the word “should” rather 
than the word “could” to complete the question when approaching moral dilemmas. We also 
expected the use of “should” to be more frequent in moral rather than in amoral dilemmas.  Does Could Lead to Good? 16 
Results and Discussion 
Participants considered “shoulds” a greater percentage of the time in a moral context (M 
= 61.54%, SD = .36) than in an amoral context (M = 36.03%, SD = .35), t(58) = 2.76, p = .008, d  
= .72. In contrast, participants who read moral dilemmas considered “coulds” (M = 8.65%, SD = 
.23) a smaller percentage of the time compared to those who read amoral dilemmas (M = 
27.94%, SD = .28), t(58) = 2.83, p = .006, d = .74. These percentages also show that people 
generally approach moral dilemmas using a “should” mindset rather than a “could” mindset, 
using the former over 61% of the time and the latter less than 9% of the time.
1 
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
These results indicate that people intuitively consider “What should I do?” more 
frequently when confronting moral dilemmas compared to amoral dilemmas, and that the 
“should” mindset is the most common mindset people adopt when contemplating moral 
dilemmas. The following studies explore the effectiveness of adopting a “should” mindset 
relative to a “could” mindset when encountering a series of ethical dilemmas.  
STUDY 2: GOAL COMPATIBILITY 
Whereas individuals have a natural propensity to consider the actions they “should” take 
when confronting ethical dilemmas, Study 2 examines the actual effect of three main modes of 
thought—should, would, and could—on the extent to which individuals view the competing 
imperatives featured in ethical dilemmas as compatible. We included a “would” mindset to test if 
adopting any mindset other than a “should” mindset changes the way people perceive dilemmas. 
																																																								
1 The remaining 30% of individuals contemplated what “would” or “will” I do.	Does Could Lead to Good? 17 
We hypothesized that relative to having a “should” or “would” mindset, having a “could” 
mindset would help individuals realize that the seemingly competing goals are in fact more 
compatible (Hypothesis 1). We based this hypothesis on prior research linking “could” mindsets 
to creativity and more expansive thinking (Langer and Piper, 1987). 
Participants  
Two hundred eighty individuals (Mage= 35.07 years; 64% female) recruited through 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk participated in an online study in exchange for $0.75.  
Design and Procedure 
Participants contemplated a series of four ethical dilemmas and were randomly assigned 
to answer the question “What ‘could,’ ‘should,’ or ‘would’ you do?” for each of the four 
dilemmas (see Dilemmas 1-4 in Appendix B). Participants then answered a series of survey 
questions that measured the extent to which they believed the two primary goals of each 
dilemma were incompatible with one another. 
Measure 
Goal compatibility. After providing responses to each of the dilemmas, participants rated 
the extent to which the two main objectives of the dilemma were incompatible (1= “It is 
definitely possible to do both at the same time;” 2 = “It is possible to do both at the same time;” 
3= “It is not possible to do both at the same time;” 4= “It is definitely not possible to do both at 
the same time”). For example, participants who read the Heinz dilemma were asked, “To what 
extent do you think 1) saving your spouse's life and 2) not breaking the law (not stealing the 
drug) are compatible/incompatible?”. 
Results Does Could Lead to Good? 18 
To test the impact of the participants’ mindset on the extent to which they thought the 
competing goals in each of these dilemmas were compatible, we conducted a repeated-measures 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the mindset (should vs. would vs. could) as the between-
subjects factor and ratings across the four dilemmas as the within-subjects factor (repeated 
measures on dilemma). The results revealed a significant main effect of the participants’ mindset 
on perceived goal compatibility, F(2, 277) = 6.55, p = .002, ηp
2 = .05. Post-hoc pairwise 
comparisons suggest that participants viewed these goals as less incompatible when 
contemplating “What could I do?” (M = 1.49, SD = .53) compared to “What should I do?” (M = 
1.70, SD = .53, p = .007) and “What would I do?” (M = 1.77, SD = .52, p = .001). There was no 
difference in goal compatibility ratings between those who contemplated “What should I do?” 
and “What would I do?” (p = .38).  
We also found a main effect of dilemmas, F(3, 831) = 23.37, p < .001, ηp
2 = .08, 
suggesting that participants perceived some of the dilemmas as featuring more incompatible 
goals than others. Post-hoc analyses revealed that participants found the goals in the first 
dilemma to be less incompatible (M1 =1.42, SD1 = 1.00, p < .08) and those in fourth dilemma to 
be more incompatible (M4 =2.00, SD4 = .85, p < .001) than those in the other dilemmas (M2 
=1.65, SD2 = .99, M3 =1.55, SD4 = .87). The interaction between participants’ mindsets and type 
of dilemma did not reach statistical significance, F(6, 831) = 1.74, p = .11. 
Discussion 
Results from this study support our first hypothesis that contemplating “coulds” helps 
individuals perceive seemingly incompatible objectives in ethical dilemmas as less incompatible 
relative to contemplating “shoulds.” The lack of evidence that “should” and “would” mindsets 
differ in their impact suggests that the impact of a “could” mindset is not driven by the Does Could Lead to Good? 19 
possibility that “should” mindsets lead individuals to perceive competing objectives as more 
incompatible relative to baseline.  
STUDY 3: “COULD” MINDSET AND MORAL INSIGHT 
Although Study 2 revealed how people think about moral dilemmas differently when in a 
“could” versus “should” mindset, these findings do not provide information on how “could” 
mindsets influence the solutions that individuals reach. In this study, participants considered a 
series of dilemmas and indicated either what they “could” or “should” do in response before 
finally reporting what they “would” do. We hypothesized that relative to a “should” mindset, a 
“could” mindset would influence individuals to engage in divergent thinking (Hypothesis 2), 
better equipping individuals to produce a broader range of possible solutions that conceded 
neither imperative embedded in the dilemma (Hypotheses 3a and 3b). 
Participants  
Two hundred six individuals (Mage= 35.02 years; 59.2% female) recruited through 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk participated in an online study in exchange for $1.50.  
Design and Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to adopt either a “could” mindset or “should” 
mindset while contemplating a series of four ethical dilemmas (see Dilemmas 1-4 in Appendix 
B). Those randomly assigned to adopt a “could” mindset provided written responses to the 
question “What could you do?” for each of the four dilemmas, whereas those assigned to think in 
a “should” mindset provided written responses to the question “What should you do?”  
All participants then answered the question “What would you do?” After these questions, 
participants then answered follow-up questions about their responses to each dilemma. Two 
independent coders blind to the study’s hypotheses rated each of participants’ written responses Does Could Lead to Good? 20 
based on their creativity and whether the proposed solutions satisfied competing values for each 
of the dilemmas. 
Measures 
Manipulation check. As a manipulation check, two independent coders blind to the 
hypotheses of the study recorded the number instances in which participants used the words 
“could” and “should” in their written responses to the question “What [should/could] I do?” 
across the four dilemmas. Because we achieved high inter-rater reliability, we averaged the 
ratings from the two raters for the number of times participants mentioned “could” (ICC2 = .92, p 
< .001) and “should” (ICC2 = .93, p < .001). 
 Divergent thinking. We measured divergent thinking based on one self-reported 
measure and another measure based on two independent coders. Participants self-reported the 
number of solutions they considered as they answered the question “What [should/could] I do?” 
Separately, two independent coders rated the extent to which participants’ solutions were 
“outside of the box” and “spanned different categories of solutions” (1= “not at all”; 4 = 
“somewhat”; 7 = “extremely”) based on Amabile’s (1996) consensual assessment technique. We 
aggregated the two rater’s responses into a single measure since the two raters achieved good 
reliability (ICC2 = .82, p < .001). 
Moral insight solutions. Two independent coders rated participants’ responses to the 
question “What would you do?” for each of the four dilemmas based on whether that solution 
resolved the underlying tension present in the dilemma. For example, we coded solutions that fell 
outside of the conventional responses “steal the drug” or “do not steal the drug” and that sought 
to meet both objectives in the dilemmas as evidence of moral insight. For example, moral insight 
solutions in response to the Heinz dilemma included “bring the story to the local media” and Does Could Lead to Good? 21 
“start a charitable foundation for my spouse.” Because we obtained high reliability between 
raters for the total number of morally insightful solutions generated across the four dilemmas, we 
averaged these ratings into a single measure of moral insight solutions (ICC2 = .81, p < .001). 
Results 
  Table 2 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations of the variables we 
measured. 
Manipulation check. We found that those in the “could” mindset used the word “could” 
(M = .90, SD = 1.02) more times in their responses than those in a “should” mindset (M = .24, 
SD = .45), t(204) = 6.08, p < .001, d = .85, whereas those in the “should” mindset wrote more 
responses containing the word “should” (M = .29, SD = .67) than did those in a “could” mindset 
(M = .12, SD = .36), t(204) = 2.35, p = .02, d = .33, suggesting that our manipulation was indeed 
effective. 
Divergent thinking. We conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA with participants’ 
mindset (should vs. could) as the between-subjects factor, the dilemma as the within-subjects 
factor, and the number of solutions participants reported considering for each dilemmas as the 
dependent variable. Across the four dilemmas, participants reported having considered more 
solutions in the “could” mindset (M = 5.06, SD = 1.75) compared to the “should” mindset (M = 
4.41, SD = 1.07), F(2, 194) = 10.70, p < .001, ηp
2 = .05. We also found a significant interaction 
between the dilemma type and mindset, F(2, 582) = 6.53, p < .001, ηp
2 = .03.  
We conducted a similar analysis based on two independent coders’ ratings of the extent 
to which participants engaged in divergent thinking on average across the four dilemmas and 
found that having a “could” mindset increased divergent thinking (M = 3.17, SD = 1.22) relative 
to having a “should” mindset (M = 2.37, SD = 1.02), F(2, 203) = 26.36, p < .001, ηp
2 = .12. We Does Could Lead to Good? 22 
also found a significant interaction between the dilemma type and mindset, F(2, 609) = 6.48, p = 
.04, ηp
2 = .01. 
Moral insight solutions.  Based on two coders’ ratings of participants’ solutions in 
response to the question “What would you do?”, we found that a “could” mindset (M = .97, SD = 
.89) generated more moral insight solutions across the four ethical dilemmas relative to a 
“should” mindset (M = .68, SD = .75), t(203) = 2.53, p = .01, d = .35. 
Mediation analysis. We examined whether divergent thinking mediated the effect of a 
“could” mindset on participants’ ability to generate moral insight solutions (Baron & Kenny, 
1986). A “could” mindset was positively associated with independent coders’ ratings of 
divergent thinking (β=.21, t=3.06, p=.002; see Table 3). When controlling for divergent thinking, 
the effect of adopting a “could” mindset was reduced to non-significance (from β=.18, t=2.53, 
p=.01 to β=.009, t=.21, p=.83), and divergent thinking predicted participants’ ability to generate 
moral insight solutions (β=.79, t=17.90, p<.001). A bootstrap analysis indicated that the 95% 
bias-corrected confidence interval for the size of the indirect effect excluded zero (.10, .45), 
suggesting a significant indirect effect (MacKinnon, Fairchild, and Fritz, 2007).  
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here 
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Discussion 
  These results support Hypothesis 2, which predicted that relative to those in a “should” 
mindset, “could” thinkers would be more likely to engage in divergent thinking as they 
contemplated solutions to difficult ethical dilemmas. Consequently, when asked what they 
“would” do, the “could” thinkers were better able to generate more moral insight solutions that Does Could Lead to Good? 23 
did not simply select one side of the dilemmas at the expense of the other, thereby supporting 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b. These results support the idea that generating moral insight encompasses 
a process of formulating multiple options and a resulting outcome—the formulation of moral 
insight solutions.  
STUDY 4: “COULD” CHANGES THE CONVERSATION 
  Studies 2 and 3 showed that “could” mindsets changed individuals’ perceptions of ethical 
dilemmas as well as their solutions when they contemplated ethical challenges privately. 
Because individuals often discuss ethical challenges with others, we investigated in Study 4 the 
extent to which a “could” mindset changes exploration of viable alternatives in interpersonal 
discussions. We conducted this study in a laboratory setting and incentivized individuals in 
dyads to adopt either a “could” or “should” mindset. We expected to find that a “could” mindset 
would lead individuals to perceive seemingly competing objectives as more compatible 
(Hypothesis 3a). Furthermore, based on research showing that people are more likely to find 
solutions to problems when they view objectives or goals as compatible rather than incompatible 
(Austin and Vancouver, 1996), we predicted that viewing these objectives as less incompatible—
as triggered by a “could” mindset—would generate greater exploration of alternatives and more 
solutions that meet both moral imperatives (Hypothesis 3c). 
Participants  
Two hundred two individuals (Mage= 22.96 years; 49.0% female) forming one hundred 
one dyads participated in a lab study at a university in the northeastern United States in exchange 
for $20 and the opportunity to earn an additional $2 based on their execution of instructions 
provided. 
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Participants were randomly assigned to adopt either a “could” mindset or “should” 
mindset while discussing an ethical dilemma with a randomly assigned partner. All participants 
read an adaptation of the analyst’s dilemma (Badaracco and Useem, 1993), which involved 
deciding whether to tell their boss strictly confidential information that would help the company, 
but hurt the roommate who divulged this information (see Dilemma 4 in Appendix B). Dyads 
were given the opportunity to discuss this dilemma for fifteen minutes in a virtual chat room and 
were informed they could end the conversation earlier if they felt that they had finished 
discussing the dilemma in the allotted time. Those randomly assigned to adopt a “could” mindset 
received $2 if they asked their partner “What could we do?” during the interaction, whereas 
“should” mindset participants received $2 if they asked their partner “What should we do?” At 
the end of the discussion, all participants then answered the question, “What would you do?” 
Participants were instructed that they did not need to agree with their partner on the ultimate 
solution. 
Participants then answered a series of survey questions measuring their perception of 
their own solutions. They assessed the extent to which they judged the multiple objectives 
presented in this dilemma as incompatible, the extent to which their proposed solution met these 
objectives, and their perceived creativity of their proposed solutions.  
Two independent coders blind to the hypotheses of the study documented the number of 
1) different possible actions that were discussed during the conversation and 2) ultimate 
solutions participants selected. Solutions that fell outside of the response “tell my boss” or “keep 
the information confidential” and that simultaneously sought to both “protect/help the 
roommate” and “help the boss/company” were considered evidence of moral insight (see Table 4 
for examples).  Does Could Lead to Good? 25 
One hundred one independent coders then rated each of the unique category of solutions 
provided based on the perceived creativity and quality of the solution. 
Measures 
Manipulation check. Two independent coders blind to the hypotheses of the study 
recorded whether participants used the words “could” and “should” in the conversations. The 
agreement between raters was significantly above and beyond chance agreement (κcould = .74, 
pcould < .001, κshould = .50, pshould < .001). 
Duration of discussion. We measured the amount of time that participants spent 
conversing with their partners about the moral dilemma. 
Moral insight solutions discussed. These coders also identified instances during each 
conversation when individuals suggested alternative solutions that satisfied competing objectives 
(help/protect roommate and help boss/company) and classified each of these as evidence of 
moral insight based on the type of action recommended (see Table 4). Because we obtained high 
inter-rater reliability between the two coders (ICC2 = .76, p < .001), we averaged the number of 
moral insight solutions discussed during the conversations into a single item. 
One hundred one independent raters blind to the hypotheses also judged these categories 
of alternative solutions (as presented in Table 4) based on the creativity (1 = “Not at all creative” 
to 7 = “Extremely creative”) and quality of the solution (1 = “Extremely bad solution,” 4 = 
“Neither good nor bad,” 7 = “Extremely good solution”). Because factor analyses revealed that 
the two typical responses clustered together as a group and the atypical responses clustered 
together as a group, we present the means averaged across categories (moral insight solutions vs. 
common solutions). 
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Perceived incompatibility of objectives. After providing an ultimate solution, participants 
rated the extent to which “maintaining the confidentiality agreement with your roommate” and 
“informing your boss about the news” were incompatible (1= “It is definitely possible to do both 
at the same time;” 2 = “It is possible to do both at the same time;” 3= “It is not possible to do 
both at the same time;” 4= “It is definitely not possible to do both at the same time”).  
Perception of solutions. Participants then rated the extent to which they believed their 
solutions met multiple objectives presented in the dilemma (1= “Met only one objective, ” 7= 
“Met all objectives”), and were creative (1= “Not at all, ” 7= “Extremely”). 
Thoughtfulness of solution. The same two independent coders blind to the hypotheses 
rated the thoughtfulness of each solution (1 = “Not at all” to 7 = “Extremely”). Since the two 
raters achieved moderate reliability (ICC2 = .55, p < .001), we averaged the two coder’s ratings 
to obtain a single measure of thoughtfulness. 
Moral insight solution selected. Two independent coders identified all unconventional 
solutions that satisfied competing goals into the same categories that were used for the 
conversations (see Table 4 for examples). Solutions were coded as morally insightful if they 
were classified in at least one of these categories. Because the two raters achieved high 
agreement (κ = .84, p < .001), we averaged the two coder’s ratings to obtain a single rating of 
moral insight solution. 
Results 
Manipulation check. Participants in the “should” mindset were more likely to mention 
“should” (M = 99.0%, SD = .07) in their discussion compared to those in the “could” mindset (M Does Could Lead to Good? 27 
= 29.8%, SD = .28), t(99) = 16.53, p < .001, d = 3.32; similarly, those in the “could” mindset 
were also more likely to mention “could” (M = 94.2%, SD = .16) in their discussion with their 
partners than those with a “should” mindset (M = 7.1%, SD = .18), t(99) = 25.89, p < .001, d = 
5.20.  
Duration of discussion. Dyads discussing what they “could” do spent more time 
discussing the dilemma (M = 601.91 seconds, SD = 310.5) than did dyads discussing what they 
“should” do (M = 482.85 seconds, SD = 246.97), t(100) = 2.17, p = .03, d = .43. 
Moral insight solutions discussed. Importantly, the “could” mindset increased divergent 
thinking that elicited more alternative responses on average from individuals (M = 1.08, SD = 
.88) than did the “should” mindset (M = .62, SD = .67) based on coding of all ideas generated 
during the discussions, t(99) = 2.91, p = .004, d = .58 (see Table 4). 
Indeed, a separate group of one hundred one independent raters found these moral insight 
solutions to be more creative (M = 4.31, SD = .91) and higher in quality (M = 4.89, SD = .88) 
than solutions that entailed selecting one imperative over the other (that is, either keeping the 
information confidential or telling the boss) (Mcreative = 1.90, SDcreative = 1.12; Mquality = 3.27, 
SDquality = 1.09), tcreative (100) = 20.95, pcreative < .001, dcreative = 4.19, tquality (100) = 11.60, pquality < 
.001, dquality = 2.32. We present means separately in Table 4. 
Perceived incompatibility of objectives. Participants in the “could” mindset rated the 
objectives in this dilemma as less incompatible (M = 1.44, SD = .86) than those in the “should” 
mindset (M = 1.76, SD = .88), t(199) = 2.57, p = .01, d = .36 
Perception of solutions. Participants in the “could” mindset rated their own solutions as 
more creative (M = 3.61, SD = 1.78) than those in the “should” mindset (M = 2.84, SD = 1.74), 
t(199) = 3.10, p = .002, d = .44. Similarly, those in the “could” mindset also believed their Does Could Lead to Good? 28 
solutions met more objectives (M = 4.35, SD = 2.01) compared to those in the “should” mindset 
(M = 3.60, SD = 1.94), t(199) = 2.72, p = .007, d = .39.  
------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------------------------- 
Thoughtfulness of solution. Two independent coders rated “could” solutions as more 
thoughtful (M = 3.90, SD = 1.32) than “should” solutions (M = 3.33, SD = 1.51), t(197) = 2.86, p 
= .005, d = .41. 
Moral insight solutions selected. Based on ratings of two independent coders, those with 
a “could” mindset were more likely to propose a solution that would simultaneously protect the 
friend and provide critical information to their boss (60.2%) relative to those in a “should” 
mindset (35.3%), t(198) = 3.74, p < .001, d = .53.  
Mediation analysis. We examined whether perception of greater incompatibility of 
competing objectives would mediate the effect of adopting a “could” mindset on the propensity 
to find moral insight solutions that address these objectives (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Adopting a 
“could” mindset was negatively associated with perceptions of goal incompatibility (B = -.31, t = 
2.53, p = .01) (see Table 4). When controlling for perceptions of goal compatibility, the effect of 
adopting a “could” mindset was significantly reduced (from B = .25, t = 3.82, p < .001 to B = 
.20, t = 3.19, p = .002), and perceptions of goal incompatibility predicted the likelihood of 
proposing a moral insight solution (B = -.16, t = 4.45, p < .001). A bootstrap analysis indicated 
that the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval for the size of the indirect effect excluded zero 
(.01, .10), suggesting a significant indirect effect (MacKinnon et al., 2007). 
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Discussion 
Results from this study support our predictions in Hypotheses 3a and 3c that adopting a 
“could” mindset helps individuals perceive seemingly incompatible goals in ethical dilemmas as 
more compatible, improving generation of moral insight solutions that satisfied multiple 
objectives. Additionally, as further support of Hypothesis 2, dyads of individuals adopting a 
“could” mindset engaged in longer discussions and explored more options when they discussed 
possible courses of actions in these dilemmas than did dyads adopting a “should” mindset. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Given that moral dilemmas are vexing and difficult to solve because they often force 
individuals to prioritize one moral imperative over another, we consider interventions aimed to 
help individuals think more expansively about possible solutions. We introduce the concept of 
moral insight and demonstrate its importance in the context of moral dilemmas. Moral insight 
encompasses (1) a process of realizing that ostensibly competing imperatives are not necessarily 
incompatible and (2) outputs in the form of solutions that meet both imperatives. We show that 
individuals’ mindsets strongly influence whether they generate moral insight when they 
contemplate moral dilemmas. 
Across four studies, we demonstrate that although individuals intuitively approach ethical 
dilemmas with a “should” mindset (Study 1), shifting individuals to consider what they could do 
helps them realize that seemingly incongruous objectives (e.g., saving a life and acting lawfully) 
are in fact less incompatible than they first appear (Studies 2 and 4). Furthermore, having a 
“could” mindset expands the set of possibilities produced (Studies 3 and 4), ranging beyond the Does Could Lead to Good? 30 
most apparent solutions that require making forced tradeoffs between moral imperatives. 
Adopting a “could” mindset helps individuals generate moral insight not only in private 
contemplations, but also in social contexts (Study 4). Together, these findings show that a shift in 
mindset from “What should I do?” to “What could I do?” leads to moral insight, enabling people 
to formulate solutions that resolve the tension between competing objectives across a series of 
ethical dilemmas.  
Theoretical Implications 
The present work contributes to research on behavioral ethics, creativity, and decision 
making. Recent research on ethics in organizations has largely focused on the antecedents and 
consequences of misconduct (Tenbrunsel, 1998; Schweitzer, Ordóñez, and Douma, 2004; Mead, 
et al., 2009; Tenbrunsel, et al., 2010; Bazerman and Gino, 2012), investigating the factors that 
influence individuals who care about morality to act unethically (Bryan, Adams, & Monin, 2012; 
Covey, Saladin, & Killen, 1989; Hershfield, Cohen, & Thompson, 2012; Jordan, Mullen, & 
Murnighan, 2011; McCabe, Trevino, & Butterfield, 2001), and the impact of these actions in the 
workplace (Greenberg, 1993; Pfarrer, Decelles, Smith, and Taylor, 2008; Palmer, 2012). More 
recently, the field has examined the impact of tools to help employees and managers make more 
ethical decisions when facing temptations to cheat (Gino and Margolis, 2011; Shu, et al., 2012; 
Moore and Gino, 2013). Although the tendency to choose wrong over right has understandably 
drawn the majority of research attention in the wake of a long list of business scandals over the 
last two decades, managers and employees in organizations must also contend with another 
comparably important category of ethical challenge: when right collides with right. However, 
recent research has been relatively silent in exploring how people might approach these 
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How people most effectively handle different types of ethical challenges—conflict 
between right and wrong, on the one hand, and conflict between two rights (or the lesser of two 
evils), on the other—is illustrated by the contrasting effect of creativity. Thus far, research on 
ethical decision making and creativity has focused on opportunities to do wrong in order to 
benefit the self, finding that creative thinking makes it more likely for people to cheat (Wang, 
2011; Gino and Ariely, 2012; Beaussart, Andrews, and Kaufman, 2013). In contrast, we find that 
in decision making contexts that pit two or more competing moral principles against one another, 
approaching the problem with a creative mindset is conducive to discovering solutions that honor 
both of the competing moral imperatives. We find that moral insight is particularly important in 
preventing the inherent tension between moral values from forcing individuals to automatically 
select one option over the other before even considering other possible options. We highlight 
how adopting a “could” mindset helps individuals utilize their creativity constructively to 
explore alternative solutions to moral dilemmas. 
The concept of moral insight introduced in this paper integrates research from insight 
(Smith, 1995; Sternberg and Davidson, 1995), decision making (Larrick, 2009), negotiations 
(Harinck and De Dreu, 2008), and creativity (McCrae, 1987; Runco, 1991). Moral insight is 
generated by subtle shifts in how moral dilemmas are approached, provoking (1) recognition that 
the incompatibility between moral imperatives is not fixed, (2) efforts to think divergently about 
resolving the conflict among those imperatives, and (3) solutions that meet the competing 
objectives or otherwise resolve the tension between them. Creativity, our findings show, can 
enhance—rather than undermine—the pursuit of moral courses of action in some domains.  
Put differently, our findings turn Kant’s famous principle of “ought implies can” on its 
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possible (Kant, 1998). Our findings show that “could implies ought” in the context of moral 
dilemmas. That is, thinking about what might be possible unleashes the potential to satisfy more 
“oughts” than would be the case if “ought” were considered first.   
Practical Implications 
Whereas prior research in ethics has focused on interventions that might mitigate 
misconduct in organizations, our research seeks to identify simple-to-implement solutions that 
equip individuals for a different type of ethical challenge—moral dilemmas. The study of ethical 
dilemmas to date has largely focused on thought experiments that test how individuals analyze, 
weigh, and adjudicate the conflicting imperatives in a dilemma (for example, Toffler, 1986; 
Greene, et al., 2001). Our findings shift the study of dilemmas to reveal how employees and 
teams might devise practical solutions that resolve the inherent tension in a dilemma. Rather than 
assume a fixed contest that requires adjudication and a tradeoff, our research indicates that 
ethical dilemmas permit multiple solutions. In fact, the extent to which individuals can find 
solutions that do not compromise one moral imperative for another depends on their ability to 
recognize that competing moral imperatives are not necessarily incompatible. 
Building on research investigating the impact of contemplating situations that tempt 
individuals to cheat (Zhong, 2011; Gunia, et al., 2012; Shalvi, Eldar, and Bereby-Meyer, 2012; 
Moore and Tenbrunsel, 2014), we show that the content of contemplation matters, particularly in 
situations where creative problem-solving is helpful in navigating among competing objectives 
and tradeoffs. In particular, shifting the content of the contemplation or conversation does not 
require a substantial change. Merely shifting the consideration of what individuals should do—
the default approach to moral dilemmas—toward what individuals could do helps individuals 
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Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
Our research has some limitations with implications for future research. First, it is 
possible that the instructions to adopt either a “should” or “could” mindset created demand 
effects that either led individuals in “could” mindsets to consider more solutions than they 
otherwise would have on their own, or influenced those in the “should” mindset to restrict their 
thinking to answer the question posed more directly. To address this concern, we asked 
participants an open-ended question at the end of each experiment regarding what they thought 
the experiment was about. We did not find any instances in which participants in the “could” 
mindset condition found consideration of “coulds” as a leading question or any evidence that 
participants suspected we were investigating the impact of adopting a “could” mindset on the 
creativity of their solutions. Furthermore, to avoid the confound that “could” mindsets open 
possibilities because those in the “should” mindset were merely following instructions justifying 
their decisions, participants in Studies 3 and 4 not only answered what they “should” or “could” 
do, but also indicated what they “would” do, giving individuals in both situations the opportunity 
to provide solutions that are outside the set of conventional responses. 
Second, more work is needed to understand how shifting to a “could” mindset has 
differential impacts on the solutions reached for different types of moral dilemmas. For example, 
some dilemmas do not involve the decision maker directly, and the consequences of those 
decisions have only an indirect impact on the decision maker. In contrast, other dilemmas feature 
other tradeoffs that involve direct costs or benefits to the individual deciding the course of action. 
Further research is needed to understand how the actors involved in the dilemma influence the 
effect of “could” thinking. Additionally, in the dilemmas featured in our research, individuals 
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and moral insight allowed individuals to integrate the underlying moral imperatives. More 
research is needed to understand how a “could” mindset influences judgments and decisions in 
other moral domains. For example, when self-gain is an option (at the expense of ethical 
principles), “could” may lead individuals to contemplate “What could I get away with?” 
Lastly, our studies were conducted online and in the lab. Although participants 
contemplated ethical dilemmas based on real situations, they did not act in the actual contexts of 
the ethical dilemmas. That is, some of the solutions classified as moral insights may not have 
been feasible, depending on the real context of these problems. Because our studies investigate 
problem solving in laboratory and online experiments, future research is needed to investigate 
how employees respond to ethical dilemmas in real organizations. Additionally, investigation of 
this question in organizations can also help answer the question of how adopting “could” 
mindsets fairs in contexts where dilemmas are dynamic—ever changing in response to the 
decisions that individuals make—and where individuals are collaborating with others, who may 
all have different mindsets and perspectives, to find a joint solution. 
CONCLUSION 
  Our research reveals how a significant class of ethical challenges, often overlooked in 
efforts to understand misconduct, benefit from the application of unconventional thinking. When 
encountering ethical dilemmas, shifting one’s mindset from “What should I do?” to “What could 
I do?” generates moral insight: the realization that ostensibly competing values are not entirely 
incompatible, exploration of more possible solutions beyond the apparent constraints of the 
problem provided, and formulation of solutions that satisfy multiple moral imperatives. Although 
our natural inclination is to contemplate dilemmas with a “should” mindset, adopting a “could” 
mindset opens a broader range of possibilities and brings us one step closer to moral insight. Does Could Lead to Good? 35 
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FIGURE 
Figure 1. Conceptual process model of the factors that generate moral insight. 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics by condition for the variables measured in Study 1. Standard 
deviations are reported in parentheses. 
 “Should”  “Could” 
Moral Dilemma   61.54% (.36)   8.65% (.23) 
Amoral Dilemma  36.03% (.35)   27.94% (.28) 
 
Table 2. Means, standard deviations, and correlations for the variables measured in Study 3.  
Variable  Mean  SD  1 2 3  4 5 
1. Response contains “could”  0.56  0.84          
2. Response contains “should”  0.21  0.55  -0.02       
3. Divergent thinking: self-reported 
total number of solutions considered 
4.72 1.47  .52***  0.03      
4. Divergent thinking: based on 
ratings from two independent coders 
2.76 1.19  .41***  0.04  .60***    
5. Moral insight solutions  0.82  0.83  .23***  0.02  .36***  .63***   
 
Table 3. Mediation analysis on moral insight solutions formulated (Study 3). 
Variable Divergent 
thinking 
 
 
X  M 
Cumulative moral 
insight solutions 
 
 
X  Y 
Cumulative moral 
insight solutions 
 
 
X, M  Y  
“Could” Mindset  .21**  .18*  .009 
Divergent thinking 
 
   .79*** 
Adjusted R
2 .04  .03  .62 
95% bias-corrected CI      [.10, 0.45] 
Note: CI = standardized confidence interval for the indirect effect. The table reports 
standardized coefficients for each regression.  
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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Table 4. Solutions discussed in conversations with partner in Study 4. Creativity and quality of 
solutions are based on ratings of 101 independent coders. 
  Categorization of each 
unique solution discussed 
in conversations 
Ratings of solution 
category based on 101 
independent coders 
 Should  Could  Creativity  Quality 
Conventional Responses      
Tell boss confidential information  .67 .78  1.88 
(1.31) 
3.21 
(1.78) 
Keep information confidential  .55 .54  1.91 
(1.43) 
3.33 
(1.89) 
Total Conventional Responses  1.22 
(.34) 
1.32 
(.46) 
1.90 
(1.12) 
3.27 
(1.09) 
Moral Insight Solution      
Ask roommate for permission to tell boss 
confidential information.  .12 .13  3.48 
(1.76) 
5.03 
(1.55) 
Convince the roommate that information 
ought to be revealed to boss.  .18 .27  3.63 
(1.63) 
4.83 
(1.62) 
Make information anonymous (provide an 
anonymous tip, making source of 
information anonymous, or both). 
.19 .40  4.37 
(1.70) 
4.48 
(1.61) 
Obtain same information through other 
channels first before telling boss.  .03 .06  4.99 
(1.43) 
5.30 
(1.55) 
Notify boss that he should investigate the 
company and arrive at same information 
independently. 
.04 .12  5.02 
(1.54) 
5.15 
(1.56) 
Tell boss confidential information while 
helping roommate find a job at the firm.  .04 .09  4.37 
(1.73) 
4.52 
(1.70) 
Total Moral Insight Solutions  .62 
(.67) 
1.08 
(.88) 
4.31 
(.91) 
4.89 
(.88) 
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics by condition for responses to ultimate solutions to the question 
“What would you do?” in Study 4. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
  P’s own perception of the ultimate solution  Two independent rater’s coding 
of the ultimate solution 
Mindset Perceived 
incompatibility 
Perceived 
creativity 
Met multiple 
objectives 
Moral insight 
solution 
Thoughtfulness 
of solution 
Should  1.76 (.88)  2.84 (1.74)   3.60 (1.94)  35.3%  3.33 (1.51) 
Could 1.44  (.86) 3.61  (1.78)   4.35 (2.01)  60.2%  3.90 (1.32) 
 
 
Table 6. Mediation analysis on propensity to generate moral insight (Study 4). 
Variable Perceived 
incompatibility 
 
 
 
X  M 
Likelihood of 
formulating moral 
insight solution 
 
 
X  Y 
Likelihood of 
formulating moral 
insight solution 
 
 
X, M  Y  
“Could” Mindset  -.31*  .25***  .20** 
Incompatibility 
 
   -.16*** 
Adjusted R
2 .03  .07  .15 
95% bias-corrected CI      [.01, .10] 
Note: CI = unstandardized confidence interval for the indirect effect. The table reports 
unstandardized coefficients for each regression.  
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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APPENDIX A 
 
As you consider your response to each situation, please fill in the blank with the word that best 
captures how you are thinking about the problem. 
 
What _________ I do? 
 
Moral Dilemma 1 
Adapted from the “Heinz dilemma” (Kohlberg, 1971). 
 
Imagine that your spouse is near death from a rare kind of cancer. There was one drug that the 
doctors thought might save your spouse’s life. It was a form of radium that a scientist in the same 
town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the scientist, who sold the 
drug through a drug store he owned, was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He 
paid $200 for the radium and charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug. 
  
You went to everyone you knew to borrow the money, but you could only get together about 
$1,000, which is half of what the drug cost. You told the scientist that your spouse was dying and 
asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the scientist said: "No, I discovered the drug 
and I'm going to make money from it." So you got desperate and considered breaking into the 
man’s store to steal the drug for your spouse. 
 
Moral Dilemma 2 
Adapted from “Merck Sharp & Dohme Argentina, Inc.” (Paine, 1997). 
 
You are the manager of a multinational pharmaceutical company’s unit in Argentina, and you are 
facing a difficult situation. You took over the company’s unit in Argentina with the expectation 
that you would modernize its practices, infuse the company with a high standard of integrity and 
fairness, make the culture more professional, and improve performance dramatically.  However, 
the company is still not on target to meet its sales goal for the year.  
  
To make these goals, you have established a new internship program to recruit top caliber talent 
for possible careers with the company. From a pool of top-notch college students, the company 
would select 15 for a paid summer internship program. 
  
You enlisted an outside consulting firm to handle the actual recruiting. The consulting company 
sifted through over 1,200 applicants and after an intense battery of tests only 30 were then 
selected to participate in a two-week program overseen by the company’s senior managers, who 
would test the 30 candidates’ skills in a variety of exercises. The final 15 would be selected at 
the end of those two weeks. 
  
Just two days before you were set to announce the 15 college students chosen for the highly-
selective summer intern program, you received a phone call from a middle manager who 
informed you that one of the candidates was the son of a high-ranking official in the 
government’s national health care program for government retirees, the single largest health care 
organization in the country. The student’s presence in the company workforce, the manager Does Could Lead to Good? 48 
stated, would give the company an excellent opportunity to increase sales well beyond the goal 
that you had set by ensuring that all its drugs were included in the government health care 
formulary. Any company would envy you for this unexpected advantage. Of the 30 candidates, 
however, this particular individual was ranked number 16 on the list, just below the cut. The 
rankings were based upon the battery of tests and senior managers’ evaluations.  
  
When Friday morning arrived, you were unsure how to proceed, but you had to inform the 
winning interns today.  
 
Amoral Dilemma 1 
You have been working hard on an essay assignment for the last week.  The prompt was about 
how the country setting of novels play a role in these pieces of literature.  You meticulously went 
through the readings centered around how different types of government policies are featured in 
these stories.   
 
Two days before the deadline, you realized that you mis-interpreted the essay prompt.  The 
question was focused on how the pastoral and farm settings (not the setting of nations) in novels 
play a role in works of literature. 
 
Amoral Dilemma 2 
You are currently in the Boston airport and have a job interview scheduled in New York in 5 
hours. The flight is only 1 hour in duration and your interview is a thirty-minute commute away 
once you land in New York.  You booked this flight since it would give you plenty of time to get 
to the meeting. 
 
Just as you thought you were about to board the plane, the flight attendant announced that your 
flight is cancelled due to the plane’s engine problems.  The next available flight in which you are 
guaranteed a seat is not for another 4 hours, which would make you late for your interview.Does Could Lead to Good? 49 
APPENDIX B 
Moral Dilemma 1 
Adapted from the “Heinz dilemma” (Kohlberg, 1971). 
 
Imagine that your spouse is near death from a rare kind of cancer. There was one drug that the 
doctors thought might save your spouse’s life. It was a form of radium that a scientist in the same 
town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the scientist, who sold the 
drug through a drug store he owned, was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He 
paid $200 for the radium and charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug. 
  
You went to everyone you knew to borrow the money, but you could only get together about 
$1,000, which is half of what the drug cost. You told the scientist that your spouse was dying and 
asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the scientist said: "No, I discovered the drug 
and I'm going to make money from it." So you got desperate and considered breaking into the 
man’s store to steal the drug for your spouse. 
 
What could/should you do?  
 
To what extent do you think 1) saving your spouse's life and 2) not breaking the law (not stealing 
the drug) are compatible/incompatible? 
 
Moral Dilemma 2 
Adapted from “Merck Sharp & Dohme Argentina, Inc.” (Paine, 1997). 
 
You are the manager of a multinational pharmaceutical company’s unit in Argentina, and you are 
facing a difficult situation. You took over the company’s unit in Argentina with the expectation 
that you would modernize its practices, infuse the company with a high standard of integrity and 
fairness, make the culture more professional, and improve performance dramatically.  However, 
the company is still not on target to meet its sales goal for the year.  
  
To make these goals, you have established a new internship program to recruit top caliber talent 
for possible careers with the company. From a pool of top-notch college students, the company 
would select 15 for a paid summer internship program. 
  
You enlisted an outside consulting firm to handle the actual recruiting. The consulting company 
sifted through over 1,200 applicants and after an intense battery of tests only 30 were then 
selected to participate in a two-week program overseen by the company’s senior managers, who 
would test the 30 candidates’ skills in a variety of exercises. The final 15 would be selected at 
the end of those two weeks. 
  
Just two days before you were set to announce the 15 college students chosen for the highly-
selective summer intern program, you received a phone call from a middle manager who 
informed you that one of the candidates was the son of a high-ranking official in the 
government’s national health care program for government retirees, the single largest health care 
organization in the country. The student’s presence in the company workforce, the manager 
stated, would give the company an excellent opportunity to increase sales well beyond the goal Does Could Lead to Good? 50 
that you had set by ensuring that all its drugs were included in the government health care 
formulary. Any company would envy you for this unexpected advantage. Of the 30 candidates, 
however, this particular individual was ranked number 16 on the list, just below the cut. The 
rankings were based upon the battery of tests and senior managers’ evaluations.  
  
When Friday morning arrived, you were unsure how to proceed, but you had to inform the 
winning interns today.  
 
What could/should you do?  
 
To what extent do you think 1) giving your company a financial advantage by hiring candidate 
16 and 2) being fair to the other candidates are compatible/incompatible? 
 
Moral Dilemma 3 
Adapted from an experience of a former MBA student 
 
Imagine that you work in the financial office of Climatex, a large company that manufactures 
heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) equipment. The CEO has been examining 
potential acquisitions in “new energy,” such as wind, solar, and geothermal. The board of 
directors has informed the CEO that any acquisition must promise at least a 6% return and, 
preferably, a return between 7% and 9%. In order to be approved, every potential acquisition 
needs to be presented with financial analysis that is reviewed by the board. 
  
A friend of the CEO owns a solar-panel company, in which the CEO invested. The CEO asked 
you to conduct a financial analysis of the friend’s company since the CEO wanted to propose 
that Climatex acquire the friend’s company. The CEO asked that you prepare a report for the 
board. In the CEO’s meeting with you, the CEO concluded, “This is a great opportunity for our 
company. Let’s find a way to recommend this as positively as possible to the board.” 
  
You were excited by the project—a high profile assignment and a chance to present to the board 
of directors. You conducted financial analyses in the two most common and accepted methods 
for doing so, and one method revealed a return of 4.5% and the other revealed a return of 5.35%. 
Even with optimistic assumptions, the return fell underneath the 6% return standard set by the 
board. Before meeting with the CEO, you reviewed your work with a colleague you respected, 
and they came to the same results. 
  
When you met with the CEO to share your analyses, the CEO asked you if the returns would 
look better if you changed some of the underlying assumptions in the analyses. The CEO 
finished the conversation by saying, “We just need a glowing recommendation to get the 
approval we need from the board on this one. This is your moment to shine and show your 
potential. Let’s see you deliver what we need.” 
  
You felt conflicted. You would need to write a report containing three components:  a 
description of the solar-panel company and its prospects, a quantitative analysis of estimated 
financial return, and a concluding recommendation to be presented in front of the board of 
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you wanted to maintain your integrity and make a recommendation that would not squander the 
company’s resources. 
 
What could/should you do?  
 
To what extent do you think 1) maintaining your integrity and 2) not damaging your career are 
compatible/incompatible? 
 
Moral Dilemma 4 
Adapted from the “Analyst’s Dilemma” (Badaracco and Useem, 1993). 
 
Imagine that you are a rising star at a medium-sized investment bank (B&B), and you are 
currently facing a decision to choose between loyalty to your roommate or to your company and 
boss.  To understand this predicament, it is important to understand that there exists a cult 
mentality at B&B in that those who stay at the company accept that loyalty to the organization 
goes before one’s health, family, and friends. 
  
The situation started when you were working on a project that involved orchestrating a leveraged 
buyout for Suntech, one of B&B’s clients.  In addition to providing short-term financing, B&B 
put together the syndicate of banks financing the deal and purchased the majority of Suntech’s 
assets, to be held for a long-term basis.  Universal was another bank on the team that was 
involved with the structuring of the deal, underwriting the loan for the senior debt.  It turns out 
that your roommate, Sandy was one of the people on Universal’s team working on the project. 
  
One day after work, you came home to find your roommate Sandy in tears.  Sandy basically 
pleaded for you to keep your conversation confidential, and you agreed, thinking this was a 
personal issue.  It turned out that Universal was dissolving its capital finance group, meaning that 
not only was Sandy out of a job, but now the deal with B&B was in serious jeopardy.  If you do 
not tell your boss at B&B about this news right away, then the public might hear of the news 
first, scaring away potential investors and putting both B&B and the client at risk.  At the same 
time, you made a promise that Sandy would not tell anyone about the situation since this 
information is confidential. 
 
What could/should you do?  
 
To what extent do you think 1) maintaining the confidentiality agreement with your roommate 
and 2) informing your boss about the news are compatible/incompatible? 